NIETZSCHE

NIETZSCHE. I keep saying that there is no rigorous way to define rationality, except a risk-management one: “what prevents you or your species from extinction”, the foundation of our Precautionary Principle. All other definitions fail under rigorous formalizations and model expansion (for instance, see proofs in Chapter 6 in Silent Risk, most stuff called “irrational” by psychologists shows the psychologists to be Pinker-style verbalistic and ignorant of probability). We are, simply, very bad at knowing what “makes sense” ex ante; only time can do so thanks the Lindy effect (survival). This is the pillar behind *SKIN IN THE GAME*.
Excited to see Nietzche got the point!
” The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong) …”
In Beyond Good and Evil, I, 4.
Why was this burried? Because scholars do believe in such sentence, given the zeitgeist of “rationalization”.
I need to thank an anonymous person on twitter.

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm

Beyond Good and Evil, by Friedrich Nietzsche
The following is a reprint of the Helen Zimmern translation from German into English of “Beyond Good and Evil,” as published in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1909-1913). Some adaptations from the original text were made to format it into an e-text. Italics in the original book are capit…
gutenberg.org

One thought on “NIETZSCHE

  1. James Jarrett

    Hi,

    I’m struggling to understand what Nietzsche meant by this line:

    The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here, perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing, and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong) …”.

    Thanks

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